COSTLY SIGNALING THEORY AND RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOR
ThweScholars of religion have described a range of somatic, reproductive, and
psychological benefits that religious communities offer. These benefits include
improved health, survivorship, economic opportunities, sense of
community, psychological well-being, assistance during crises, mating opportunities,
and fertility (see Reynolds and Tanner 1995 for a review). Religion's
ability to promote group solidarity and cooperation underlies its
capacity to offer many of these benefits. Irons (2001; also see Cronk 1994a;
Sosis 2000) suggests that religion can promote intra-group cooperation by
increasing trust among adherents. Various authors have argued that religion
facilitates intra-group cooperation, most notably Durkheim (1995
[1912]); however, Irons's work posits a plausible adaptive explanation for
why it occurs. He argues that in human history the adaptive advantage of
group living was the benefits that individuals attained through intra-group
cooperation such as cooperative hunting, food sharing, defense, and warfare.
However, despite the potential for individual gains through cooperation,
these collective pursuits are often difficult to achieve. Intra-group
cooperation is typically characterized by conditions in which individuals
can maximize their gains by refraining from cooperation when others invest
in the cooperative activity. Thus, although everyone may gain if all
group members invest in the cooperative goal, attaining such large-scale
cooperation is often difficult to achieve without social mechanisms limiting
the potential to free-ride on the efforts of others (Dawes 1980; Olson
1965).
The potential for collective action is confronted with problems of trust
and commitment (Frank 1988; Schelling 1960). When individuals can
guarantee their participation in a cooperative pursuit, intra-group cooperation
is more likely to emerge. However, in most human social interactions
it is impossible to guarantee a commitment to cooperate. Those who interact
can advertise a willingness to cooperate, although this strategy is
not stable. When faced with the conditions of collective action, the incentive
to falsely claim that one will cooperate is especially high since individuals
can achieve their greatest gains by refraining from cooperation
when others cooperate. Therefore, whenever an individual can achieve net
benefits from defection, the only credible signals of cooperative intentions
are those that are "costly-to-fake." If commitment signals are not costly-tofake,
they can easily be imitated by free-riders who do not intend to invest
in the cooperative pursuit. Several researchers (Berman 2000; Cronk 1994a;
Irons 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 2001; Iannaccone 1992, 1994) have suggested
that religious behaviors are costly-to-fake signals of commitment.
Communities that share a religious identity require a host of ritual obligations
and expected behavioral patterns. For example, many populations
require males and females to undergo initiation rites that include beatings,
genital mutilations, exposure to extreme temperatures, tattooing, isolation,
food and water deprivation, consumption of toxic substances, and
death threats (e.g., Tuzin 1982; Whiting et al. 1958; Young 1965). In literate
societies, religious legal codes (e.g., Laws of Manu, Talmud, etc.) outlining
appropriate behavior tend to be formalized and regulate a wide range of
activities, including food consumption, work, charitable commitments,
and dress, as well as defining the frequency and structure of ritual ceremony
and prayer. Although there may be physical or mental health benefits
associated with some ritual practices (see Levin 1994; Reynolds and
Tanner 1995), the significant time, energy, and material costs involved in
imitating such behavior serve as effective deterrents for anyone who does
not accept the teachings of a particular religion. Therefore, religions often
group members. Religious beliefs appear to be well suited to solve collective
action problems by increasing commitment and loyalty to others who
share these beliefs. By increasing trust among group members, religious
groups avoid or minimize costly monitoring mechanisms that are otherwise
necessary to overcome free-rider problems that typically plague communal
pursuits.
By way of example, consider Ensminger's (1997) argument that the
spread of Islam throughout Africa resulted from the economic advantages
of religious conversion. Ensminger claims "Islam was a powerful ideology
with built-in sanctions which contributed to considerable self-enforcement
of contracts. True believers had a non-material interest in holding to the
terms of contracts even if the opportunity presented itself to shirk" (1997:.
Thus, Islam provided a mechanism to overcome the collective action problems
of long-distance commerce. Conversion to Islam increased trust
among traders, which reduced transaction costs, making trade more profitable.
In addition, high levels of trust among Muslim coreligionists allowed
for greater credit to be extended, facilitating further trade expansion.
Ensminger contends that the steep initiation costs of entry into Islam, such
as daily prayer, abstaining from alcohol, fasting during Ramadan, and the
pilgrimage to Mecca, served as the means for establishing a reputation
among traders for trustworthiness. In other words, these rituals and taboos
are costly signals of commitment that served to prevent free-riders from
achieving the benefits of more efficient trade.
Irons's theory may provide insights into the adaptive functions of a
wide range of religious rituals, including subincision rites, mourning practices,
and even prayer. It may also explain a variety of secular rituals (cf.
Sosis and Bressler 2003). For example, army boot camp and fraternity hell
week can both be interpreted as necessary rites that signal commitment to
other group members. Nevertheless, there are several issues in the argument
that need clarification.
Some Predictions of the Model
Irons (2001) has discussed a variety of hypotheses generated by his theory
of religion as a hard-to-fake sign of commitment. The model presented
here suggests several additional hypotheses and directions for future
research.
Risk of Free-riders. In environments where the risk of potential free-riders
is low, there will be few costly signals. There are at least three conditions
where the risk of potential free-riders is low: groups are isolated and members
do not have the opportunity to join alternative groups, populations
are distinguished by inherent physical characteristics, such as skin color,
and the net benefit offered by a group is low in comparison to the net benefits
offered by alternative groups. Under each of these conditions, groups
are not expected to exhibit costly signals, or at least the level of costly signaling
should be relatively low. Conversely, when the potential benefits of
group membership are high, morphological traits are unrelated to group
composition, and many groups are in close proximity; groups are expected
to exhibit many costly signals. This may explain the frequent observation
that religious diversity in a population increases religious participation
(e.g., Finke and Stark 1988; Finke et al. 1996; Hamberg and Petersson 1994).
For example, Iannaccone (1991) shows that church attendance among
Protestants is positively correlated with religious diversity across a sample
of European countries, North America, Australia, and New Zealand. If
costly signals are a function of the alternative opportunities available for
group members, we may also expect that minority groups, whose members
are at higher risk of being influenced by ideologies and practices of
the majority group (Latane 1997), will exhibit more costly signals than majority
groups.
Early Indoctrination. Early indoctrination will be important for groups
with many costly signals. Early indoctrination minimizes the opportunity
costs perceived by group members, increasing their ability to tolerate
costly constraints on their lives. As a Hutterite man from Montana commented,
"It seems you have to be born with the Hutterite way, to be
brought up from childhood on, to abide by these rules. . . . If you are
brought up like this, you're not used to all these things you see in town"
(Wilson 2000:22). The Talmud, the vast compendium of Jewish law, also
recognizes the importance of early indoctrination in decreasing opportunity
costs. Jews who "return" to traditional Judaism are known as ba'alei
teshuva (literally "owners of return"). In a well-known Talmudic statement
the sages claim, "in the place where a penitent Jew-a ba'al teshuva-
stands, even a perfectly righteous person cannot stand" (Berakhot 34b). The
Rabbis suggest that those who have sinned can achieve a higher level of
spirituality than those who have been righteous all their life. Without having
ever tasted sin, the temptation to transgress is not as great as for those
who have. Rabbi Joseph Telushkin, who was raised in an Orthodox household,
states this clearly:
The apparent rationale of the rabbis for holding the ba'al teshuva in such high
esteem was their belief that it is a much greater struggle for a nonreligious
person to become religious and to give up formerly permitted practices, than
it is for a religious person to remain religious. More than a few ba'alei teshuva
(plural of ba'al teshuva) have told me that they desperately miss lobster or
shrimp. As a Jew who was raised in a kosher home, I confess that these foods
have never tempted me (Telushkin 1991:433).
Converts. As a result of the importance of early indoctrination for minimizing
opportunity costs, converts may be trusted less than those who
were raised within a community. This is especially likely amongst groups
that maintain high levels of costly signaling. Converts will perceive higher
opportunity costs than members by birth; thus the willingness to pay the
high cost of membership may be viewed with skepticism about the intentions
of the convert.9 For example, it has been well documented that ba'alei
teshuva who enter the Ultra-Orthodox or haredi community are unlikely to
be welcomed as equals (e.g., Levin 1986). In his book on haredi life David
Landau writes,
Haredism's celebration and absorption of the teshuva movement is not necessarily
matched by a wholehearted acceptance of the individual ba'al or
ba'alat teshuva into the haredi family. The litmus test is marriage, and here
ba'alei teshuva often find their paths blocked by an informal but strongly entrenched
discrimination. . . . The whispered assumption in haredi circles is
that if a haredi-born boy or girl marries a ba'al teshuva, there must be "something
wrong" with him or her: either they are poor, or they have a health disability
. . . (Landau 1993:248-249).
This bias against ba'alei teshuva occurs despite a recurring emphasis in Jewish
liturgy and law on accepting the proselytite as a full member of the
community. It appears that those born into the haredi community recognize
that the costs of membership are too high to be paid without early indoctrination.
The devotion of the ba'alei teshuva is not doubted by the
haredi-born; ironically it is their rationality that seems to be in question
(Levin 1986).
Apostasy. Across religious groups, the costliness of ritual requirements
should be positively correlated with apostasy rates among newcomers. In
other words, groups with the highest levels of costly signaling will also exhibit
the highest rates of defection among their new members, since costly
rituals operate as a sorting mechanism that removes those who are not fully
committed to the group. Indeed, although most cults are successful at attracting
members, it has been estimated that up to 90% of all new members
leave cults in the first several years (Robbins 1988). Data among Shakers
also show that neophytes were about twice as likely to defect as veteran
members (Bainbridge 1984). Despite these losses, groups with costly requirements
probably possess the highest retention rates of members raised
in the community, since these in-born members are likely to have lower potential
success in alternative groups. Groups with significant ritual demands
tend to be closed communities that are isolated from other segments
of society. Thus, their members generally have less knowledge about alternative
groups, face higher socialization costs if they were to join another
group, and have fewer kin and non-kin relations in alternative groups that
could assist in a transition. In addition, as a consequence of the necessary
investment in learning and performing rituals during childhood, comparatively
less time and energy is invested acquiring the skills that are often
important to compete economically in other communities. The remarkable
retention rates among Hutterites, who only lose about 2% of their members
(almost all Hutterites are in-born;10 Peter 1987), appear to support these
claims. In addition to the difficulty in adapting to a radically different way
of life, the formal English education of Hutterite children ends at eighth
grade, making them underqualified for most jobs outside of their colonies.
Van den Berghe and Peter note, "adolescent Hutterites frequently explore
the outside world, especially boys, but nearly all return to the fold"
(1988:527). Among groups less extreme than Hutterites, data are also suggestive.
Catholicism and Judaism in the U.S. have higher retention rates
than liberal Protestant denominations (Roof and McKinney 1987).
It should be noted that the costly signaling theory of ritual does not predict
that in-born members will never leave their community. The model
presented above assumes that as a result of the gains achieved from intragroup
cooperation, religious groups offer higher benefits to their members
than non-religious groups. When this condition is not met, we expect religious
groups to fail or at least face increasing rates of defection. Economic
changes, either economic difficulties within the group or improved economic
conditions in other groups, are likely to have a significant impact on
membership retention rates. For example, Murray (1995a) has documented
how Shaker populations grew during economic recessions and
declined during times of prosperity. Other factors, such as changes in the
sex ratio (in- and out-group), increased religious persecution, and changing
membership skills, are all expected to alter the cost-benefit equation
and impact decisions about whether to remain within a particular group.
It should also be emphasized that the model focuses on individual decision-
making, and thus membership decisions should vary predictably
with individual phenotypic quality. Across religious groups there is wide
variance in the phenotypic traits that are valued and rewarded. These include
such traits as diligence, manual skills, scholarship, spirituality,
courage, and fierceness. Within religious communities, those who are
comparatively deficient in the venerated traits are most likely to defect
and seek opportunities in groups that value other characteristics. For example,
male Ultra-Orthodox Jewish life revolves around continual study
of traditional texts. Scholars are sought after for marriage and attain the
highest prestige within the community. Not surprisingly, within these
communities defection rates appear to be highest among those who are
less intellectually oriented (Landau 1993). Apostasy is also most likely to
occur among individuals with the greatest potential success in alternative
groups. For example, Murray (1995b) found that as new members increased
the illiteracy rate among the Shakers, the defection rate among literate
veteran members increased. He comments that those who departed
"proved to be skilled craftspeople, astute business executives, creative
theologians, and, not least, able leaders" (1995b:231-232).
Proselytization. Proselytization should be less frequent amongst religious
groups that offer greater in-group benefits since proselytization increases
the risk of invasion by free-riders. A glance across the religious landscape
suggests that without refinement, this hypothesis will not be supported.Although
proselytization is absent amongst some groups that engage in high
levels of costly signaling (and presumably offer significant in-group benefits),
such as Jews and Hutterites, for other groups that engage in similar
levels of costly signaling, such as The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, missionary work is a central element of religious practice. Indeed,
the two-year mission required of Mormons can be understood as a costly
signal of commitment to the church. Proselytization is likely to be not only
a function of absolute levels of in-group benefits, but also a function of the
value of increased membership for a group. Proselytizing religions may
face increasing marginal gains as membership increases; in other words,
per capita benefits of group membership may increase as the number of
members grows. A variety of factors could contribute to this economy of
scale, such as increased political clout or lowered costs of purchasing religious
material culture (via increased supply). Increasing benefits with increasing
membership size may characterize The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, which is currently among the fastest growing religions
in the world (Stark 1994). Hutterites, on the other hand, may not be able to
realize these benefits. Indeed, Hutterites divide their colonies when they
reach 100 members since social control is apparently more difficult to maintain
in larger communities (Hostetler 1997). Judaism was not always a nonproselytizing
religion. Jews regularly proselytized prior to the first and
second centuries c.e., and possibly later (Baron 1952:171-183). Eventually,
the benefits that accrued to Jews through increasing membership were
outweighed by the costs, typically death, for missionary activity imposed
by Christian authorities, such as emperors Hadrian, Severus, and Constantine.
Interestingly, in the U.S., where Jews have achieved unprecedented acceptance
into mainstream society, there have been renewed discussions
about proselytizing (Epstein 1994) and currently various Jewish organizations
and congregations actively seek converts.
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