The End of Europe
By Robert J. Samuelson
Wednesday, June 15, 2005; Page A25
Europe as we know it is slowly going out of business. Since French and Dutch voters rejected the proposed constitution of the European Union, we've heard countless theories as to why: the unreality of trying to forge 25 E.U. countries into a United States of Europe; fear of ceding excessive power to Brussels, the E.U. capital; and an irrational backlash against globalization. Whatever their truth, these theories miss a larger reality: Unless Europe reverses two trends -- low birthrates and meager economic growth -- it faces a bleak future of rising domestic discontent and falling global power. Actually, that future has already arrived.
Ever since 1498, after Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope and opened trade to the Far East, Europe has shaped global history, for good and ill. It settled North and South America, invented modern science, led the Industrial Revolution, oversaw the slave trade, created huge colonial empires, and unleashed the world's two most destructive wars. This pivotal Europe is now vanishing -- and not merely because it's overshadowed by Asia and the United States.
It's hard to be a great power if your population is shriveling. Europe's birthrates have dropped well below the replacement rate of 2.1 children for each woman of childbearing age. For Western Europe as a whole, the rate is 1.5. It's 1.4 in Germany and 1.3 in Italy. In a century -- if these rates continue -- there won't be many Germans in Germany or Italians in Italy. Even assuming some increase in birthrates and continued immigration, Western Europe's population grows dramatically grayer, projects the U.S. Census Bureau. Now about one-sixth of the population is 65 and older. By 2030 that would be one-fourth, and by 2050 almost one-third.
No one knows how well modern economies will perform with so many elderly people, heavily dependent on government benefits (read: higher taxes). But Europe's economy is already faltering. In the 1970s annual growth for the 12 countries now using the euro averaged almost 3 percent; from 2001 to 2004 the annual average was 1.2 percent. In 1974 those countries had unemployment of 2.4 percent; in 2004 the rate was 8.9 percent.
Wherever they look, Western Europeans feel their way of life threatened. One solution to low birthrates is higher immigration. But many Europeans don't like the immigrants they have -- often Muslim from North Africa -- and don't want more. One way to revive economic growth would be to reduce social benefits, taxes and regulations. But that would imperil Europe's "social model," which supposedly blends capitalism's efficiency and socialism's compassion.
Consider some contrasts with the United States, as reported by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. With high unemployment benefits, almost half of Western Europe's jobless have been out of work a year or more; the U.S. figure is about 12 percent. Or take early retirement. In 2003 about 60 percent of Americans ages 55 to 64 had jobs. The comparable figures for France, Italy and Germany were 37 percent, 30 percent and 39 percent. The truth is that Europeans like early retirement, high jobless benefits and long vacations.
The trouble is that so much benevolence requires a strong economy, while the sources of all this benevolence -- high taxes, stiff regulations -- weaken the economy. With aging populations, the contradictions will only thicken. Indeed, some scholarly research suggests that high old-age benefits partly explain low birthrates. With the state paying for old age, who needs children as caregivers? High taxes may also deter young couples from assuming the added costs of children.
You can raise two objections to this sort of analysis. First, other countries are also aging and face problems similar to Europe's. True. But the aging is more pronounced in Europe and a few other nations (Japan, for instance), precisely because birthrates are so low. The U.S. birthrate, for example, is 2.1; even removing births to Hispanic Americans, it's about 1.9, reports Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute. Second, Europeans could do something about their predicament. Also, true -- they could, but they're not.
A few countries (Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands) have acted, and there are differences between Eastern and Western Europe. But in general Europe is immobilized by its problems. This is the classic dilemma of democracy: Too many people benefit from the status quo to change it; but the status quo isn't sustainable. Even modest efforts in France and Germany to curb social benefits have triggered backlashes. Many Europeans -- maybe most -- live in a state of delusion. Believing things should continue as before, they see almost any change as menacing. In reality, the new E.U. constitution wasn't radical; neither adoption nor rejection would much alter everyday life. But it symbolized change and thereby became a lightning rod for many sources of discontent (over immigration in Holland, poor economic growth in France).
All this is bad for Europe -- and the United States. A weak European economy is one reason that the world economy is shaky and so dependent on American growth. Preoccupied with divisions at home, Europe is history's has-been. It isn't a strong American ally, not simply because it disagrees with some U.S. policies but also because it doesn't want to make the commitments required of a strong ally. Unwilling to address their genuine problems, Europeans become more reflexively critical of America. This gives the impression that they're active on the world stage, even as they're quietly acquiescing in their own decline.
The End of Europe
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Brendan
Who needs them?
Ross Terrill: A bloc to promote freedom
July 19, 2005
GENTLY reproached for not visiting Australia while in office, Henry Kissinger rejoined that the Australians never caused a crisis. Count it the deprivation of being a loyal junior ally. No country has fought with the US in every significant war between World War I and Iraq except Australia.
The reward for good behaviour seems to be neglect. Is it self-defeating to be a reliable ally? Why not kick up a fuss as Paris does and get more attention? Most American media focus on countries that give President Bush trouble (France, Germany) rather than Bush friends such as Japan and Australia that quietly support him.
Yet the strategic and economic importance to the US of Japan and Australia combined outweighs that of France and Germany combined. How many readers of The New York Times know that Australia's economy is larger than Russia's? Or that the top four economies in East Asia are Japan, China, South Korea - and Australia?
John Howard, now visiting Washington, told a joint session of the US Congress in 2002: "We have taken our place beside you in the war against terrorism, knowing beyond all doubt that it was an attack upon ourselves and our way of life as surely as it was upon your own."
Days after 9/11, Howard invoked ANZUS, which was originally aimed by Canberra at preventing any resurgence by Japan, to trigger anti-terrorism co-operation with Washington.
On February 19, 1942, 188 bombers from Japan killed 243 Australians in Darwin. In October 2002, Islamic thugs killed 202, 88 of them Australians, in a Bali nightclub. Howard concluded, as Bush did, that evil was local. The new enemy was hard to detect. Remedies would include extending democracy around the globe.
Bilateral alliances are not sexy these days. Tony Blair is denigrated as Bush's poodle by the not-so-very intelligentsia. Junichiro Koizumi of Japan is underestimated. Few American readers and viewers have been told how and why Howard won a string of four electoral victories. And so on.
Australia, Japan and others have found that an alliance with the US can be nerve-racking, not least during the agonies of Iraq. A broader grouping, knitting the bilateral into the multilateral, may be the next step.
Asia-Pacific lacks a shared landmass, culture, religion, language, or race (contrast Europe and Latin America, where more commonalities exist).
But now that democracy bulks large in international relations, it could be time for East Asia's first grouping based on values. Oddly enough given their 1940s history, Japan and Australia would be its spiritual linchpins. Japan, the most Western of Asian countries; Australia, probably headed to be the most Asian of Western countries.
An association of Asia-Pacific democracies would be open-ended; any country could join as it becomes democratic. The association would not target an enemy; an East Asian NATO is not required. NATO, the quip ran, was to keep the Soviets out, the US in, and Germany down; presumably an Asian equivalent would keep the US in, Japan down, and China out. But history has bypassed such harsh patterns.
An AAPD would blend Asia and the West. East Asia's successes have without exception utilised this blend. Hong Kong and Singapore married Chinese skills to British institutions. Taiwan and South Korea harvested American PhDs and sold to the US and other developed markets. Post-Mao China flung open the door to Western and Japanese ideas and money. By contrast, stagnating pockets (Laos, Burma, North Korea) all chose to stand aside from East-West interaction.
It is no accident that the two most anti-democratic regimes in East Asia (North Korea and Burma) are its chief troublemakers. The rise of China furrows brows, but it's welcome -- except for the ongoing political authoritarianism of Beijing. As Japan's post-1945 evolution killed the notion that East Asian civilisation precluded democracy -- a lesson reiterated by Taiwan from the 1990s -- an AAPD would further demonstrate the universal applicability of democracy and rule of law.
An AAPD would not be aimed at China and I believe Beijing would eventually join it. No great civilisation is dictatorial by nature. Howard has generally struck a sensible balance between seizing the economic opportunities in China yet being wary of China's lingering authoritarianism and military swagger. He doesn't moralise about China, as some Americans do, yet is clear-eyed that Australia-China common interests do not extend to political values.
Within the US, Japan, Australia and other countries, an AAPD might attract support from normally opposed political parties. The Left would favour its internationalist idealism and multiculturalism; the Right would claim Bush's pro-democracy leadership and Howard's liberal values were being applied to East Asia.
No American president and Australian prime minister have ever talked as frequently and intimately as Bush and Howard. That measures the unprecedented health of the Washington-Canberra tie. As they meet again late tonight -- after the usual race down the agenda followed by a smooch about each other's political situation -- they could discuss supplementing ANZUS with a pro-democracy East Asian grouping. This would enhance Australian influence (more than making a fuss like the French).
"The defence of freedom requires the advance of freedom," Bush told the National Defence University recently. If he is serious let him prove it East Asia. Australia, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and other democratic friends of the US can do more for their national interest, each other and East Asia if the spokes of bilateralism, with democracy as hub, become the wheel of multilateralism.
Ross Terrill is associate in East Asian research at Harvard University. His books include The Australians (Doubleday, 2000) and The New Chinese Empire (University of NSW Press, 2004).
Ross Terrill: A bloc to promote freedom
July 19, 2005
GENTLY reproached for not visiting Australia while in office, Henry Kissinger rejoined that the Australians never caused a crisis. Count it the deprivation of being a loyal junior ally. No country has fought with the US in every significant war between World War I and Iraq except Australia.
The reward for good behaviour seems to be neglect. Is it self-defeating to be a reliable ally? Why not kick up a fuss as Paris does and get more attention? Most American media focus on countries that give President Bush trouble (France, Germany) rather than Bush friends such as Japan and Australia that quietly support him.
Yet the strategic and economic importance to the US of Japan and Australia combined outweighs that of France and Germany combined. How many readers of The New York Times know that Australia's economy is larger than Russia's? Or that the top four economies in East Asia are Japan, China, South Korea - and Australia?
John Howard, now visiting Washington, told a joint session of the US Congress in 2002: "We have taken our place beside you in the war against terrorism, knowing beyond all doubt that it was an attack upon ourselves and our way of life as surely as it was upon your own."
Days after 9/11, Howard invoked ANZUS, which was originally aimed by Canberra at preventing any resurgence by Japan, to trigger anti-terrorism co-operation with Washington.
On February 19, 1942, 188 bombers from Japan killed 243 Australians in Darwin. In October 2002, Islamic thugs killed 202, 88 of them Australians, in a Bali nightclub. Howard concluded, as Bush did, that evil was local. The new enemy was hard to detect. Remedies would include extending democracy around the globe.
Bilateral alliances are not sexy these days. Tony Blair is denigrated as Bush's poodle by the not-so-very intelligentsia. Junichiro Koizumi of Japan is underestimated. Few American readers and viewers have been told how and why Howard won a string of four electoral victories. And so on.
Australia, Japan and others have found that an alliance with the US can be nerve-racking, not least during the agonies of Iraq. A broader grouping, knitting the bilateral into the multilateral, may be the next step.
Asia-Pacific lacks a shared landmass, culture, religion, language, or race (contrast Europe and Latin America, where more commonalities exist).
But now that democracy bulks large in international relations, it could be time for East Asia's first grouping based on values. Oddly enough given their 1940s history, Japan and Australia would be its spiritual linchpins. Japan, the most Western of Asian countries; Australia, probably headed to be the most Asian of Western countries.
An association of Asia-Pacific democracies would be open-ended; any country could join as it becomes democratic. The association would not target an enemy; an East Asian NATO is not required. NATO, the quip ran, was to keep the Soviets out, the US in, and Germany down; presumably an Asian equivalent would keep the US in, Japan down, and China out. But history has bypassed such harsh patterns.
An AAPD would blend Asia and the West. East Asia's successes have without exception utilised this blend. Hong Kong and Singapore married Chinese skills to British institutions. Taiwan and South Korea harvested American PhDs and sold to the US and other developed markets. Post-Mao China flung open the door to Western and Japanese ideas and money. By contrast, stagnating pockets (Laos, Burma, North Korea) all chose to stand aside from East-West interaction.
It is no accident that the two most anti-democratic regimes in East Asia (North Korea and Burma) are its chief troublemakers. The rise of China furrows brows, but it's welcome -- except for the ongoing political authoritarianism of Beijing. As Japan's post-1945 evolution killed the notion that East Asian civilisation precluded democracy -- a lesson reiterated by Taiwan from the 1990s -- an AAPD would further demonstrate the universal applicability of democracy and rule of law.
An AAPD would not be aimed at China and I believe Beijing would eventually join it. No great civilisation is dictatorial by nature. Howard has generally struck a sensible balance between seizing the economic opportunities in China yet being wary of China's lingering authoritarianism and military swagger. He doesn't moralise about China, as some Americans do, yet is clear-eyed that Australia-China common interests do not extend to political values.
Within the US, Japan, Australia and other countries, an AAPD might attract support from normally opposed political parties. The Left would favour its internationalist idealism and multiculturalism; the Right would claim Bush's pro-democracy leadership and Howard's liberal values were being applied to East Asia.
No American president and Australian prime minister have ever talked as frequently and intimately as Bush and Howard. That measures the unprecedented health of the Washington-Canberra tie. As they meet again late tonight -- after the usual race down the agenda followed by a smooch about each other's political situation -- they could discuss supplementing ANZUS with a pro-democracy East Asian grouping. This would enhance Australian influence (more than making a fuss like the French).
"The defence of freedom requires the advance of freedom," Bush told the National Defence University recently. If he is serious let him prove it East Asia. Australia, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and other democratic friends of the US can do more for their national interest, each other and East Asia if the spokes of bilateralism, with democracy as hub, become the wheel of multilateralism.
Ross Terrill is associate in East Asian research at Harvard University. His books include The Australians (Doubleday, 2000) and The New Chinese Empire (University of NSW Press, 2004).
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